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Exchange Consolidations: Help or Hospice?
Philip McBride Johnson'
Two blacksmiths who had competed to shoe the horses of the
townspeople for 30 years watched as the first automobile drove down
the main street. Recognizing that something big was occurring, they
set aside their rivalry and met to discuss a response. When the
blacksmiths emerged, they announced that they were merging their
blacksmith business.
Might this be the future for the growing number of central financial
markets that have announced interest in combining forces, often across
national lines? In both the securities and derivatives worlds, new rivals
have emerged to offer comparable services for similar transactions. This
article raises the question whether exchange mergers can stem or reverse
the gains made by those alternative execution methodologies. The article
is based in part on my own experience working with markets for over 50
years,2 and incorporates a generous dose of conjecture. Unfortunately, if
there are empirical data that resolve this matter definitively, I have been
unable to locate them.
Markets for financial instruments and commodities have evolved
over the centuries from the occasional get-together of nearby producers
and buyers to nanosecond electronic execution facilities that operate
from anywhere with lightning speed ("flash trades"), and often operate
beyond the berm (read "dark pools"). The preeminence of even the
mature central exchanges has been challenged by these new systems.
Like the blacksmiths, one might wonder why, instead of merging with
each other, they do not either acquire or create competitive mechanisms
to confront these rivals head-on.
A Few Words About Markets. Markets are commonly comprised of
three participants:
1. Philip McBride Johnson is a past Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (1981-1983), a 2009 inductee into the Futures Industry Association's Hall of
Fame, a former member of the New York Stock Exchange Regulatory Advisory
Committee (1988-disolution), and the founder and first chairman of the American and
International Bar Associations' Derivatives Law Committees. He is co-author of the
three-volume treatise Derivatives Regulation, now in its fourth edition.
2. Including providing legal services to 33 exchanges in 21 countries, some for a
decade or more and a few for a generation.
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* Speculators, who from time to time commit funds in the hope
that their results will be profitable;3
* Hedgers, who take positions that will generate profit from
events that hurt their commercial bottom line; and
* Professional traders, who make a career of trading with
speculators and hedgers.4
In the securities world, there has long been a contest between
exchange-executed transactions and those brokered privately (the "over-
the-counter" or "OTC" market). Federal law legitimizes both routes.
And while, well into my career, doing business on an exchange was
heavily preferred (a listing on the New York Stock Exchange was cause
for jubilation), the OTC dealer slogged along with what remained outside
that privileged circle. Today many, if not most, securities transactions
bypass the exchanges. 5
The history of futures, options, and other "derivatives" is more
complex. In the United States, the futures markets operated largely free
from federal oversight for nearly 70 years, focusing mainly on grain and
other farm products. As reliance on central exchange prices became
more prevalent at the beginning of the 20th century, and apprehension
grew among producers, processors, and exporters about whether the
prices disseminated by the exchanges were bona fide, pressure was
placed on Congress to impose some kind of oversight. After all, in major
cities (Chicago, in particular), wheat and corn prices were set as much by
"floor traders" as by merchants. Who were these urbanites to decide
what my crop is worth? Would they even recognize a soybean in the
unlikely event they ever saw one?
By 1922, the agricultural community had amassed sufficient
political power to induce Congress to pass legislation creating a
regulatory framework for the futures (and related options) markets, and
3. "Speculation," a word often used derisively, means to voluntarily take a risk on
the outcome of events over which one has no effective control, hoping to gain if correct.
"Investment," a word commonly associated with prudence and caution, means to
voluntarily take a risk on the outcome of events over which one has no effective control,
hoping to gain if correct.
4. Also previously known as "floor traders" when exchange transactions took place
mainly in cavernous trading rooms.
5. While reliable empirical data may be lacking as to the current relative market
shares of exchange-executed transactions and OTC transactions, it is telling to note that
the SEC estimates NYSE only executed 25.1% of the consolidated share volume in its
listed stocks in October 2009, down from 79.1% in January 2005. Concept Release on
Equity Market Structures, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3595 (Jan. 21, 2010).
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the task was assigned to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 6 Oddly,
this development was met by the markets with mixed emotions. On one
hand, the markets would lose their absolute control over their own
operations. On the other hand, it became an opportunity to try to
eliminate a class of pesky competitors who often set up shop next door
and induced people to trade look-alike products offered directly by those
dealers. Some of the vendors were crooks; most were not. The
exchanges had tried to exterminate these competitors through the
enactment of state "bucket shop" laws, but the results were hit-and-miss.
Now, maybe Congress would agree to a ban against off-exchange futures
and options if the central markets would accede to federal regulation.
Congress obliged. From the date of enactment of the first federal
futures legislation, it was not only unlawful, not only criminal, but
felonious to engage in futures trading anywhere except on a regulated
exchange.8 There would be no over-the-counter futures market; prison
stripes awaited anyone who tried.
And so it remained until the 1980s. In the meantime, however,
major regulatory changes occurred in other areas. First, as the futures
markets branched out from agriculture into currencies, energy, and
metals, Congress began to question whether oversight by the USDA was
still the best approach. In 1974 it replaced the USDA with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), a five-member
independent agency of the United States.9 But two potential problems
had to be solved first. With futures markets offering products to many
different industries, most of which were already supervised in their
activities at the federal, state and/or local levels of government, the
specter arose that the CFTC might have to share jurisdiction with these
other authorities depending upon what industry is involved. Second, the
CFTC would have inherited a statutory definition of "commodity"
(integral to determining whether a futures contract or option existed) that
was a long list of farm products, nothing else.'o So, even if the CFTC
could overcome the issue of jurisdictional proliferation, its remit would
remain only with the agricultural sector and other regulators could
emerge if any other industry were affected.
6. See Grain Futures Act of 1922, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998. At that time, and for years
thereafter, the statutory definition of "commodity" consisted of a litany of farm products
to which new items would be added as trading in them commenced. See id. § la.
7. See generally David Hochfelder, "Where the Common People Could Speculate":
The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Origins of Popular Participation in Financial
Markets, 1880-1920, 93 J. AM. HisT. 335 (2006).
8. See Grain Futures Act § 4.
9. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
§ 101, 88 Stat. 1389, 1385 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2008)).
10. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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Congress elected to grant the CFTC "exclusive jurisdiction"" and
also amended the definition of "commodity" to assure that all items in
which futures trading takes place fall within the CFTC's sole authority.12
This consolidated futures regulation within a single federal agency.
By the 1980s, however, there emerged a new form of derivative that
would gradually adopt the generic name of "swaps." In their early
iteration, these instruments tended to be agreements between major
banks to hypothetically alter their loan portfolios without actually
transferring any of the outstanding loans.' 3  To illustrate, Alpha Bank
might have a loan portfolio with more fixed-rate borrowings than it
would like to have, while Beta Bank would have more variable-rate loans
than it wanted. Alpha's concern was that its emphasis on fixed-rates
would deprive it of the opportunity to benefit if interest rates were to rise,
while Beta lacked the protection it wanted in case interest rates were to
decline. Each would agree to "set aside" a part of its portfolio and to
treat it as if the other bank were the owner. Then, periodically, both
banks would calculate the change in the yield on the agreed loans. If
interest rates had risen, Beta would pay to Alpha the increase on those
variable-rate loans while, if interest rates had declined, Alpha would pay
the higher amount received on its fixed-rate loans. The same result
might have been achieved through the use of interest-rate futures
contracts available on CFTC-regulated exchanges but, for reasons
discussed below, the private arrangements held more appeal.
It did not take long for the CFTC to wonder aloud whether these
"swaps" might actually be futures contracts and, if so, unlawful due to
the Commodity Exchange Act's on-exchange requirement.14 After all,
like futures, the instruments were of limited duration, tracked changes in
a stated value, and were typically settled in cash between the parties.
After review, and subject to conditions, the CFTC declared that these
11. Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 § 201 (codified as
amended 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)(2010)). The author led the effort to secure this result and
contributed the statutory language.
12. Id. (current version at 7 U.S.C. § la(4)). The author contributed the new text for
this definition by consulting a number of Uniform Acts that, by their nature, seek to
capture a broad spectrum of activity with few words. For tangible items, the phrase
"goods and articles" was chosen, for intangibles "rights and interests," and for labor the
term "services."
13. For a brief overview of swap transactions, see PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON,
DERIVATIVEs: A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S MOST POwERFUL FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS 10-16 (1999).
14. See Hochfelder, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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swaps could be offered privately, a policy that prevailed for about a
decade. 1
But by the end of the 1990s, the use of swaps had migrated to
dozens of different industries in very substantial volume, used mainly to
hedge against higher operating costs or declining resale prices. The
CFTC signaled its intention to revisit the matter generally,16 setting off a
fierce lobbying effort to thwart any change in the status quo and
culminating in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 that
effectively prohibited the CFTC from involving itself in this activity.17
Over the ensuing years, the swap market grew rapidly. It is
estimated today that the notional value of swaps now exceeds that of
regulated futures contracts by some multiple, although precise
comparisons are challenging.'8 It appears that swaps hold appeal in the
commercial world over futures for a variety of reasons, arranged here in
ascending order of importance based upon the author's many discussions
with swap market participants:
* Privacy. Exchange trading is highly visible. Orders are
generally open to public view. And the details of completed
transactions (except identities) are commonly disseminated on
a real-time basis. But swaps can be negotiated and executed
on a bilateral basis and there has not been (until recently) any
need to disclose what has occurred. The less competitors
know....
* Disruption. Related to privacy, many swaps are of such
magnitude that offering them into the public market could
destabilize prices there, at least momentarily. No such effect
is risked with private transactions.
* Counterparty Risk. Trading on the regulated futures markets
opens the transaction to all takers. While the risk of
counterparty default is small due to the guarantee provided by
the exchange's clearing house, the ability to winnow potential
15. Policy Statement on Certain Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,684 (July 21,
1989). This was followed in 1993 by formal rules. 17 C.F.R. §§ 35.1-.2 (1993)
(amended 2000).
16. Concept Release on Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (May
12, 1998).
17. Pub. L. No. 106-544, app. E § 105(b), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-379 (2000)
(codified as amended 7 U.S.C. § 2(g) (2010)).
18. See Statistical Annex, BIS Q. REV. Sept. 2011, at A131-Al37, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r qal 109.pdf [hereinafter "BIS Statistics"].
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counterparties in advance for their creditworthiness is seen as
a valuable precaution of private negotiation.
* Collateral. While regulated exchanges and their clearing
organizations follow a strict policy of margining all
transactions, requiring initial deposits of funds and later
additions if market changes are adverse, what (if any)
collateral is needed for a swap is left to the good judgment of
the immediate parties. Many commercial firms believe that
they free up substantial capital by using swaps that can be
employed for other purposes.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010,'9 massively amending the Commodity Exchange Act, undertook
to draw swaps closer to the bosom of the CFTC through the imposition
of numerous new requirements similar to those endured for years by the
regulated futures exchanges. In particular, it was billed as legislation
that would require many, if not most, swaps to be executed on
competitive trading venues, either pre-existing "designated contract
markets" (where futures occur) or new "swap execution facilities." It
was also said to force more such swaps onto clearinghouses where
obligations are guaranteed by funds aggregated by its principal users.
While those goals may yet be attained, several features of the Dodd-
Frank Act suggest that the outcome could be quite different.
Definition of "Swap. " The revised Act defines the term "swap"
very broadly, and calls on the CFTC to provide additional content.20 In
particular, the statutory definition captures many of the commodity
options that CFTC had regulated under pre-existing authority.2 In
addition, the CFTC has signaled that it may allow to be classified as
"swaps" certain instruments that-identical to futures---require or allow
the physical delivery of the underlying asset.22  If so, no discernible
difference would any longer exist between futures and swaps, offering
the specter of swaps absorbing futures as the prevailing trading system
for derivatives and, potentially, letting traders choose their preferred
regulatory regime simply by what they elect to call their instruments.
19. Title VII, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
20. Id. § 72 1(a)(47).
21. See, e.g., CFTC Regulations Part 32 that governed the offer and sale of off-
exchange commodity options, 17.C.F.R. § § 32.1-32.13.
22. This uncertainty arises from the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly
categorizes most options as "swaps" whether or not they involve delivery, and its
inclusion of credit default swaps within that definition even though they commonly call
for delivery of the underlying security. Commodity Exchange Act § la(47).
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Exemptions. The Dodd-Frank Act offers a generous number of
exemptions for swaps only from the on-exchange/clearing requirement,
not least for swaps used by commercial firms to hedge or manage their
business risks.23 The CFTC has also signaled that it may allow
commercial hedgers substantial leeway in making their own collateral
arrangements.2 4 The author estimates that this waiver will affect many if
not most swaps. As a result, private dealings may be only moderately
affected by these reforms.
In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department seems set on exempting
swaps involving foreign currencies. 25 The forex market itself has a $4
trillion-dollar-per-day turn-over.
Finally, customized swaps that do not lend themselves to be
duplicated in sufficient volume to warrant trading on a central market
need not be accepted by any exchange or clearinghouse. This, too, could
shelter a great many swaps.
So, Dodd-Frank does not necessarily mean a massive shift of swaps
to a fully-regulated regime. Most will incur new federal requirements
but may remain in the realm of privately-negotiated arrangements
through systems paralleling the traditional markets. For instance, the
CFTC may not require strict collateralization-as on exchanges-for
private swaps of commercial hedgers.26 There should remain abundant
competition to the exchange-centric model. This gives rise to the
question: will mergers among exchanges address this threat or simply
"circle the wagons" without addressing the true threat?
On the securities side, the same question is posed and, in some
ways, more acutely since alternative trading systems can be used not
only for security derivatives but for exact copies of exchange-listed
offerings, as has been the case for generations. While consolidations
among traditional exchanges will amplify their trading numbers, and
perhaps their revenues, through the simple physics of combining data
that would otherwise be reported separately, there is reason to wonder
whether this strategy can or will blunt the real challenge facing those
markets. And there are frictions that might impede even this cosmetic
change.
Antitrust. Even for domestic exchange mergers, close scrutiny is
expected of any two significant exchanges that propose to do so. Even
23. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(h)(7).
24. Proposed Rules on Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers
and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732 (Apr. 28, 2011).
25. Notice and -Request for Comments on Determination of Foreign Exchange
Swaps and Forwards, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,829 (Oct. 29, 2010).
26. Proposed Rules on Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers
and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732.
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the potential for eliminating the possibility of dual listings of the same
securities or derivatives could give antitrust authorities reason for pause.
This concern is elevated for cross-border alliances, not only because
multiple competition reviews will occur but because a sense of
"dominance" at the international level would touch a far wider economy.
Regulation. Where more than one regulator has the burden of
market integrity and performance, neither will want to reduce its grip
over policy, supervision, or enforcement. For cross-border link-ups, this
impediment is magnified. In a European/U.S. merger like Deutsche
Boerse and NYSE Euronext, each of the national regulators wanted to
retain the tools necessary to protect the people they are sworn to serve.
Even if one regulator is assigned "primary" responsibility, others retain a
seat at the table for key decisions and during crises.27 This could not
only produce a shifting regulatory landscape for the combined exchanges
but require that key functions-clearing, surveillance, rule
enforcement--remain separate in order to accommodate local authorities
and thus reduce the normal cost benefits of consolidations.
Nationalism. This is less a problem in the realm of financial
markets but it played a factor in stopping mergers between the London
Stock Exchange and Canada's TMX Group as well as between the
Singapore Exchange and the Australian Stock Exchange. And it can
emerge years later when national interests diverge.
Investor Sentiment. While exchanges are enjoying record volumes
and fees due to recent price volatility, their shareholders seem to see a
different future. Shares of the New York Stock Exchange have fallen
nearly 15% this year, and the CME Group stock is off more than 21%.28
Might they be equally worried about the encroachment of private
systems that current exchange strategies seem to ignore?
Intuition. While this is in the realm of a "sixth-sense," seasoned
veterans of financial markets would have considered it unthinkable 10
years ago that the storied New York Stock Exchange would put itself on
the auction block and cede control to others. When something this
improbable occurs, powerful new forces have emerged that did not
previously exist.
27. The European Commission's rejection of the NYSE and Deutsche Boerse
merger due to antitrust concerns highlights the complexity inherent to an overlapping
regulatory landscape. See Jacob Bunge, NYSE-Deutsche Boerse Joins Dead Deal List,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2012, at C2.
28. See Investor Relations, CME GROUP, http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-
relations/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2011); Stock Information, NYSE EURONEXT,
http://corporate.nyx.com/en/investor-relations/stock-information (last visited Sept. 24,
2011).
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Unintended Consequences. The financial press reported that the
Deutsche Boerse/NYSE-Euronext merger would have reduced the need
for margin requirements by about $4 billion dollars through a merger of
their derivatives clearing houses.2 9 This outcome may have been good
news for market users but perhaps not for shareholders. If (as occurs in
the U.S.) the clearinghouses make money from investing cash margins
and from service fees charged clearing members by investing on an
overnight basis as well, consolidation could produce reduced revenues
for the combined exchanges.
What to Do. I take no fault in exchange mergers. The question is
whether, for whatever benefits will accrue, they may simply postpone the
day when alternative trading systems and over-the-counter derivatives
make them obsolete.30 The $9.3 billion price tag that was attached to the
DB/NYSE merger suggests that the answer, right or wrong, will bear a
heavy cost. Better minds than mine have grappled with this question and
yet the trend toward exchange combinations remains alive and well.
My question is whether the same funds might be more fruitfully
used by building or acquiring a direct challenge to the exchanges' major
competitors. Why not go gung-ho into the alternative trading systems
world or full-bore into the over-the-counter swaps business? Why not
improve on my opening scenario with the following:
Two blacksmiths who had competed to shoe the horses of the
townspeople for 30 years watched as the first automobile drove down
the main street. Recognizing that something big was occurring, they
set aside their rivalry and met to discuss a response. When they
emerged, they announced that they were combining to buy an auto
dealership.
29. FINANCIAL TIMES, September 15, 2011, at 13.
30. The best comparison between the size of the OTC derivatives market vs.
exchange-traded derivatives that I have found is a report by the CME Group dated May
23, 2011 entitled OTC Derivatives Marketing Activity citing and analyzing BIS Statistics,
supra, note 18. The reader is encouraged to review that document, including its caveats.
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